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ABSTRACT 
The article is an attempt at – yet once again – finding a source of more fitting metaphor for the study 
of consciousness inside the framework of quantum mechanics. It starts by doubting into the possibility 
of the naturalization of research of experience. Proceeding from that it searches for a more adequate 
way to implement Varela’s idea about a balanced bridging the explanatory gap. By comparing certain 
positions of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanical phenomena with the properties of 
introspection, it tries to point out that there might exist better epistemic positions for understanding 
consciousness than the ones most frequently used today. 
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In his seminal article Neurophenomenology: a methodological remedy for the hard 
problem,Varela [1] points out the problem of absence of the first-person perspective in 
contemporary cognitive science. The author suggests a strategy of bridging the explanatory 
gap: a balanced, mutually inspiring research both from the first- and third-person perspective. 
Despite his explicit arguing for the equality of both approaches, only three years later Varela 
encouraged the publishing of the compendium Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues In 
Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science [2] in which the editors (among them 
also Varela) argue for the integration of phenomenology into an explanatory framework in 
the way that the only properties acceptable would be the ones that are compatible with the 
properties admitted by natural science. Phenomenology is thus welcome, but only after 
accepting the standards of measuring demanded by natural science. 
Dan Zahavi [3] presents a comprehensive analysis of the possibilities for including first-
person positions into cognitive science. He concludes that from the point of view of 
transcendental phenomenology (i.e. phenomenology which is not synonymous with a type of 
empirical research of experience, as understood by most first-person research methods in 
contemporary cognitive science) such inclusion is impossible. In many aspects, the project of 
naturalization of phenomenology is in direct opposition to the objectives of phenomenology 
as a research project which does not settle for non-critical acceptance of our everyday 
intuitions about the nature (and existence) of the world. “For Husserl, natural science is 
(philosophically) naive. Its subject matter, nature, is simply taken for granted. Reality is 
assumed to be out there, waiting to be discovered and investigated” [3; p. 337]. From this 
point of view phenomenology is “unnatural”, as it “calls for a reflective stance quite unlike 
the one needed in the positive sciences. This, of course, is one reason why the 
phenomenological attitude has frequently been described as an unnatural direction of thought. 
But to describe phenomenology as unnatural is of course also to deny any straightforward 
continuity between philosophy and natural science” [3; p.337] (also [4; p.14]). 
While Zahavi sympathises with the idea of including the first-person approach into cognitive 
science, he also points out that the above-mentioned authors of the project of naturalization 
also called for a reexamination of the concepts of naturalization.  “They also speak in favor of 
recasting the very idea of nature, and of the need for modifying our modern conception of 
objectivity, subjectivity, and knowledge. In other words, why let the reductionists 
monopolize the concept of naturalism? Most revealing of all, however, is perhaps a reply 
given by Varela to a question that I posed to him at a meeting in Paris in 2000: The volume 
Naturalizing Phenomenology was only intended as the first part of a larger project. The 
second complementary volume was planned to carry the title Phenomenologizing Natural 
Science” [3; p.342]. Thus it would appear that Varela was quite serious when talking about 
the balanced bridging. Unfortunately, the second part of Varela’s project – the 
phenomenologization of natural science – was hindered by his untimely death in 2001. It is 
well known that since then the use of first-person data in cognitive science has gained some 
recognition, alas in the vast majority of cases merely as supplement to third-person research. It 
is not yet clear how a more balanced structure could be conceived. In Neurophenomenology 
Varela offers us mere glimpses into how the first- and third-person side might inform each 
other. Instead of correlational research, Varela envisions a more reconciliatory concept of 
‘mutual constraints’. It is not yet entirely clear how such mutual informing should take place. 
It has certainly not been clearly demonstrated by empirical studies so far. 
At this time, cognitive science has not yet succeeded in appropriately including first-person 
data. Thus the conclusion reached by Roy et al. [5; p.7] that cognitive science is “a theory of 
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the mind without being a theory of consciousness. It is a theory of what goes on in our minds 
when they are cognizing without being a theory of what it is like to be a cognizing mind” is 
still valid. Later on I suggest an alternative starting point which might help unify first- and 
third-person research. Following the example of the strategy which enabled the very 
emergence of cognitive science as an interdisciplinary area, I discuss the possibility of a new 
metaphor which could be relevant for both sides of the explanatory gap. 
THE MANIFOLD FACES OF QUANTUM MECHANICS 
A metaphor that might allow for a more holistic research of the mind will be looked for in 
quantum mechanics. The idea for seeking inspiration for theories of consciousness in the 
strange laws governing the quantum world is by no means a new one. Andrej Ule [6] gives an 
excellent overview of the attempts to explain quantum reality on the one hand and theories of 
consciousness frequently related to them on the other one. He mentions that as early as 1923 
the biologist Alfred Lotka has suggested some connections between the laws of quantum 
mechanics and certain properties of consciousness. Quantum mechanics has acted as a kind 
of source of hope and inspiration for numerous researchers of consciousness ever since. Ule 
concludes that their positions can vary widely: anything from enthusiastic acceptance of the 
quantum basis of human consciousness to outright rejection of such a possibility and even 
ironic disregard for any connection between the two as absolute nonsense. 
According to Ule [6], the debate about the connection between quantum physics and 
consciousness can be divided into three main lines of thought: 
a) searching for the origin of consciousness in the quantum (or even subquantum) world; 
b) attempts to understand the influence of consciousness on quantum mechanical 
measurements (the question if quantum physics demands the presence of a conscious 
observer); 
c) notions about the parallels between quantum mechanical (physical) reality and 
consciousness as two separate aspects which nevertheless share a common origin, or as 
one aspect viewed from opposite perspectives. 
Ule adds that beside these, many other questions arise as well, like for example: does the 
human brain include some special quantum mechanic processes which are responsible for the 
emergence of consciousness; or is there some special type of psycho-physical interaction 
between consciousness and the reality of microphysics; or does such an interaction reach 
beyond the horizon of naturalistic explanations; or could we explain free will by referring to 
quantum indeterminism etc. [6]. 
Ule mentions following reasons for the popularity of quantum mechanics for considerations 
about consciousness: 
i) quantum physics as the fundamental physical theory also represents the fundamental 
theory of consciousness – on condition that we accept the assumption of the natural origin 
of consciousness; 
ii) in case we do not accept this assumption, quantum physics might nevertheless appear even 
more appealing for thinking about consciousness. Ule quotes the (dualistically inclined) 
opinions of some prominent quantum physicists about quantum mechanics in itself 
demanding the existence of conscious observers, i.e. it is impossible to formulate it 
adequately in the absence of such consciousness; 
iii) unlike all other theories of natural science, quantum mechanics does not adhere to 
determinism and causal explanation of phenomena (or at least it appears so), thus allowing 
for certain components which allow for the existence of free will (Ule even claims that 
they appear slightly ‘spiritual’). Among such components the most appealing and weird 




quantum mechanic states, inseparability of the observer and the observed (measured) 
quantum phenomenon, momentary or at least incredibly fast ‘leaps’ from very coherent, 
mutually consistent changes in quantum objects to chaotic processes, quantum 
entanglement and nonlocality (regardless of the spatial distance among objects, the 
changes in their physical states stemming from some common quantum system always 
occur simultaneously, sometimes even reaching into the future); 
iv) as one of the possible reasons for the appeal of quantum physics Ule also mentions the fact 
that “quantum physics, despite its incredibly sophisticated mathematical apparatus, 
continuously gives the impression of incompleteness, as if begging for some additional 
‘interpretation’. In this, a certain level of anthropomorphism, i.e. interpretation by using 
analogies with the human mental world, is virtually inevitable. To many it would appear 
that due to its mysteriousness, quantum mechanics can only be related to the similarly 
mysterious phenomenon of consciousness. Neither quantum mechanics nor consciousness 
can be reduced to or included into the world of ‘macrophysics’ governed by classical 
physics. This gives rise to the assumption that one mystery might be explained by another, 
at least by finding parallels between the two if not otherwise” [6; p.68]. 
Here I might venture to add one more reason: conclusions (or even ‘forced thoughts’) implied 
by certain properties of quantum mechanics, despite being remote from our assumptions 
about the functioning of the ‘outer’ world, are quite similar to the anatomy of our experience. 
I hope that in the following section I will be able to demonstrate that this ‘reason’ might not 
be as speculative as it may seem at first sight. 
Most attempts at relating consciousness and physics originate in non-physical circles. Most 
physicists do not concern themselves with the deeper meaning of the equations they use. This 
has become especially obvious in the last decades, ever since the interpretation that the 
observer effect (i.e. the role of consciousness in measurement) can be explained away with 
the so-called quantum decoherence has become dominant – a principle explaining the 
meeting of the micro and the macro world without referring to consciousness. Nevertheless, 
some physicists are still convinced that the only way to resolve some of the fundamental 
problems of physics today is to rethink its ontological fundament. Their discussions mostly 
revolve around the question how to preserve a minimal version of realism in the face of all 
the weird laws of the quantum world. I believe a discussion of fundamental assumptions is 
very much necessary and I hope we will soon witness an attempt at a physical theory which 
would make a step into the direction hinted at by some of the quantum considerations – and 
thus radically give up realistic presuppositions. Perhaps Varela’s idea of the 
phenomenologization of natural science might represent an appropriate basis for that? 
This text however has no such ambitions. It will not delve into ontological speculations. 
Instead, it compares certain quantum physical patterns to phenomenological patterns. Ule 
warns us about the danger of interpreting quantum laws, especially when trying to apply the 
insights and doubts of quantum physics in the area of research of consciousness. As he says: 
“Thus anyone trying to write about these topics will find themselves on a slippery slope of 
scientifically acceptable assumptions from which one might quickly slip into a sea of 
incontrolable speculations where any thesis about the above-mentioned questions and issues 
proposed by anyone, while having very eloquent and vibrant metaphors and some fervent 
advocates and equally determined opponents, has very few convincing arguments” [6; p.67]. 
I utterly agree with Ule’s warning. I believe that ‘eloquent and vibrant metaphors’ might 
quickly turn out to be misleading by offering us a false feeling of comprehension or even 
explanation. Nevertheless, this is exactly what I will attempt to achieve. From the history of 
cognitive science it is well known that a good metaphor can be very useful in this 
interdisciplinary field (even if it does not necessarily give an explanation). 
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LEAVING BEHIND THE SPLIT BETWEEN OBSERVER AND THE 
OBSERVED1 
Most physicist swear upon the so-called Copenhagen decree: “Shut up and calculate” – the 
realization that there is no point in thinking about the ontology behind quantum phenomena, 
which are clearly very weird and unfathomable. What really matters to physics is that the 
measurements fit equations and models. The Copenhagen interpretation can be seen as a ban 
for physicists to consider philosophical (or, more precisely, ontological) questions. That was 
the position, for example, of Albert Einstein and David Bohm, who spent a large part of their 
careers fighting against such interpretations. Most physicists obey the “Shut up and calculate” 
directive by quietly presupposing a realistic notion of the world: they believe they are 
measuring and exploring something from the point of view of a measurement-independent 
observer. It should be pointed out that such physicists do not follow in the footsteps of Bohr’s 
understanding of the Copenhagen interpretation. Bohr was anything but a philosophically 
naive physicist who would wish only to calculate while disregarding any wider perspective. 
Quite the opposite, Bohr indulged in intensive study of philosophy, especially the ideas of the 
Danish philosopher Harald Høffding, in which he found inspiration for some of his 
suggestions about the interpretation of the formalisms of quantum physics. To him, the ban 
on the discussion of ontology was the result of the realization that the observed reality is the 
only thing we can say something about with certainty (it is thus much better to talk about 
observables rather than measurements in quantum physics). This insight seems very close to 
Husserl’s realisation about the primary nature of experience and the importance of accepting 
experience as it is given. 
Following the above mentioned parallel, I will attempt to construct my proposition: to 
research physics through the observable and consciousness through phenomenal data – 
experience as it is given. We are thus talking about quantum physical observations, which 
might as well be phenomenological observations. We have given up ontological discussion in 
order to focus on the overview of epistemological patterns. 
ILLUSION OF THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS OR THE STREAM OF EVENTS? 
Dan Dennet and later Susan Blackmore famously deny William James’ intuition of the 
existence of the stream of consciousness. In the multiple drafts theory by D. Dennett, “there are 
no fixed facts about the stream of consciousness independent of particular probes” [7; p.138]. 
Like Dennett, Susan Blackmore [8] also points out that in the absence of probing there is no 
need for categorizing mental processes into conscious and unconscious ones. The answer to 
“what it is like to be” exists only when we inquire about it. It is the probing itself which 
creates the feeling of a stream of consciousness. Introspection is here regarded as the probing 
of potentiality, or – to start using physical metaphors – a probability cloud of experience which 
forms the result: the subject’s belief about experience. This is quite similar to a quantum 
probability function which only crystallizes into concreteness when probed (measured). 
MEASUREMENT, INTROSPECTION, PROBING 
Two of the most common objections against the use of introspection as a form of scientific 
research technique are the so-called subject-object split and the excavation fallacy. The first 
objection points out that in introspection the demarcation line between subject and object 
becomes unclear. Who (or what) is researching what (or whom)? The latter one is about how 
the experience becomes distorted by the very act of introspection itself. Phenomenologically 
speaking, observed or attended experience is definitely not the same as unattended and this 




Bitbol and Petitmengin [9] attempt to bypass such objections by rethinking the epistemology 
behind the act of introspection. They roughly follow the phenomenological line of thinking 
by rejecting the understanding of introspection as an act of dividing the field of experience 
within which one segment of consciousness (the subject) observes another distinct segment 
(the object). Instead, introspection is perceived as a full-fledged new experience – as opposed 
to it being merely a passive reproduction of parts of experience which exist an sich, 
independently of the act itself. 
Thinking about experience it is often tempting to adopt an objective viewpoint which 
presupposes that experiential phenomena exist independently of the process of observation. 
Such a view promotes the tendency to study experience an sich and prevent the 
contamination of the results of observation. Such conceptions present a vantage point for the 
above-mentioned objections. If introspection is viewed as an entirely new experience, such 
objections become irrelevant, since the definition no longer contains an independent past 
experience an sich that could be compared to the belief about past experience. 
This is not to say that introspection does not have a very special epistemic status (distinguishing 
it from other approaches to the study of mind and the world). This status however cannot be 
grounded in its accuracy or correctness – instead it stems from its unique intention to see 
beyond everyday theories and beliefs about experience and contemplate lived experience in 
its pure form. Edmund Husserl [4] used the expression natural attitude to designate the 
totality of presuppositions and theories commonly applied in our apprehension of the world. 
According to him, pure contact with experience is possible only by discarding this natural attitude. 
Husserl denominated the process of such contemplation of experience as phenomenological 
reduction. It is this act of intending to bracket the natural attitude gives introspection its 
special epistemic status and not its alleged ability to achieve the split between the object and 
the subject (of the “measurement”). The very nature of introspection is a transformative one 
(and not passive, as one would expect from any good measurement): it is the endeavour to 
disregard the prism of assumptions implied by the natural attitude, thus attempting to 
transform the naïve view of experience into a reflective one [1]. Thus, the act of introspection is 
not a second-order addition to experience or its disturbance, as perceived by many researchers. 
The demonstrated interdependence of data and the process of acquiring it is analogous to the 
situation encountered in quantum mechanics, where prior to the measurement a particle only 
exists as a distribution of probabilities of the states in which it might be encountered. It is the 
very act of measurement that causes the so-called collapse of the wave function by which a 
particular state (among all the possible ones) is determined. In a way, the exact reality of the 
particle only comes into being once it has been measured. Due to this inseparability of the 
measured phenomenon and the act of measurement itself, Niels Bohr (in [9]) proposed to 
replace the idea that measurement in quantum mechanics disrupts the measured phenomenon 
by the interpretation in which the phenomenon is co-defined by the conditions of its 
measurement. According to such understanding, the measurement does not disturb, but rather 
determine the phenomenon. Similarly, in our conception of introspection we refuse to 
perceive experiential data as existing an sich, independently of the process of introspection 
and thus prone to being contaminated by it. Instead, the data itself is grounded in the 
introspective process. Any objections about the contaminating nature of introspection thus 
lose their value. Instead, the act of introspection is seen as co-defining experience. Horizons 
of introspection are perceived as a characteristic of both the measurement instrument and the 
act of measuring itself, indistinguishable from the measured phenomenon which they thus do 
not contaminate but rather co-determine. 
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UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE AND THE CONSTRUCTIVE PROCESS OF THE 
EMERGENCE OF AN OBSERVABLE 
This analogy of quantum entities as a composite of measurement might be expanded even 
further. In quantum mechanics, measuring causes the so-called collapse of the wave function. 
From a state in which all that is known is the probability distribution of individual states in 
which the researched phenomenon could be encountered, the collapse selects one of these 
states and changes it from probable into actual, just like the questioning tackles the gist or the 
feeling of being able to answer into an actual answer. Probing selects a part of the cloud of 
the feeling that the answer is in reach and carves out the answer. Thanks to Schroedinger’s 
uncertainty principle, we know that in quantum mechanics we can never see all of the aspects 
of the observed entity. For example, one must decide whether to measure the properties of a 
particle or a wave. Choosing one (e.g. its position), this can be measured with great precision, 
but only at the expense of the other one of the complementary variables (e.g. momentum), 
about which in this case we can find out nothing at all. Or we could measure both at the same 
time, but with much less precision. The analogy with the gesture of becoming aware is 
evident: the question determines the answer. The probing determines or rather co-creates the 
resulting belief about experience. One can focus only to a limited number of “parameters”. 
The act of introspection is always marked by the introspector’s presuppositions of what is to 
be observed, the so-called horizon, and it is hard to imagine how such a horizon could entail 
the totality of all possibilities (aspects) of human experience. It always picks just one aspect 
and dismisses the others. One could even envision pairs of complementary aspects of 
experience, but that would exceed the aim of this article. 
The well-known physicist John Archibald Wheeler once attempted to describe quantum 
reality, the process of the collapse of the wave function, by using the metaphor of the game of 
twenty questions. We believe this metaphor is also very appropriate for describing the 
iterative, self-referential process of creating belief about (past) experience. Twenty questions 
begins when one of the players (let us call him the inquirer) leaves the room. The others then 
select an object, a person, an animal etc. The aim of the inquirer is of course to discover what 
it was that the other players have selected. She disposes with twenty questions by which she 
tries to pinpoint the object in question. Wheeler was convinced that this might be a good 
description of the collapse of the wave function – provided that a minor twist be added to the 
game: in Wheeler’s version, when the inquirer leaves the room, the other players do not 
select an object. All other rules apply. The inquirer, believing that somewhere in the heads of 
the other players there exists a desired object, starts asking questions, thus narrowing down 
the space of the potential conclusions of the game. The participants are bound to take account 
of all previous answers – every new answer has to be consistent with all previous ones. The 
final answer is thus enacted through an interchange of questions and answers. Every question 
co-determines the answer, every answer narrows down the set of possible questions. This 
process might in the end bring us to a point in which only one entity is possible, but it just as 
well might not, in which case the answer is left hanging. 
To speak about an answer in itself existing before the probing has started thus becomes 
pointless. In Garfield’s words (as cited by Bitbol and Petitmengin): “Indeed, observational, 
temporal, and interpretative distortions can only be called ‘distortions’ with respect to experience 
as it is in itself, previous to any attempt at observing, catching, and interpreting. In other 
terms, the previous objections rely on some version of the myth of the ‘given’” [10; p.270]. 
Despite giving up the notion of a given experience, similarly to quantum mechanics we 
remain stuck in the dialectics emerging “between (a) the actual inseparability and (b) the 




The list of parallels does not end here. It could be a topic for an entirely different discussion 
to consider the oscillations between the epistemic position of natural attitude characteristic of 
our everyday life, and the more reflected, philosophical positions (like constructivism etc.) It 
would be very easy to compare such “oscillations” with Bohr’s observations about the 
“dialectic” between “(i) the situation of an introspector who wishes to observe herself by 
splitting into a subject part and an object part, and (ii) the situation of an experimenter in 
quantum mechanics who is (instrumentally and interpretationally) intermingled with 
microscopic phenomena, yet wants to observe them. In both cases, said Bohr, one witnesses a 
kind of dialectic between (a) the actual inseparability and (b) the alleged necessity of 
separation between subject and object“ [9; p.177]. 
CONCLUSION 
The objective of this article is to examine the possibility of a new metaphor for the research 
of consciousness. I have compared (some of) the Copenhagen interpretations of the weird 
consequences of accepting quantum formalism with the (equally unintuitive) characteristics 
of the act of introspection. The article takes quantum discourse as a starting point, but one 
could as well start from the other side – from phenomenological considerations. In this spirit, 
let me conclude with a quote from Zahavi [12; p.336] in which he summarises Husserl’s 
position: “Frequently, the assumption has been that a better understanding of the physical 
world will allow us to understand consciousness better and rarely, that a better understanding 
of consciousness might allow for a better understanding of what it means for something to be 
real. However, one of the reasons why the theory of intentionality has often assumed a central 
position in phenomenological thinking is exactly because a study of the world-directedness of 
consciousness has been claimed to provide us with insights into not only the structure of 
subjectivity, but also into the nature of objectivity. That something like a conscious 
appropriation of the world is possible does not merely tell us something about consciousness, 
but also about the world.“ 
Could it be that by studying consciousness we might actually learn about the world? 
REMARK 
1The inspiration for and a part of this part of the text is taken from the yet unpublished article 
1by Urban Kordeš and Ema Demšar entitled What Is It Like To Answer the Question ‘What 
1Was It Like…’?. 
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